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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2925 
___________ 
 
CUI HUA LI, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A094-813-593) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Dorothy A. Harbeck 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 22, 2013 
Before:  SCIRICA, VANASKIE and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 23, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Cui Hua Li (“Li”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals‟ 
(“BIA” or “Board”) dismissal of her appeal and denial of her motion to remand.  For the 
following reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
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I. 
 Li is a citizen of China from Fujian Province who entered the United States 
without inspection.  In February 2008, she filed applications for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), alleging persecution 
under China‟s coercive population control policies.  In particular, Li alleged that upon her 
return to China, she would be forcibly sterilized because she is the mother of two children 
born in the United States.  Following a hearing, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied 
relief, determining that Li did not have an objectively reasonable fear that she would be 
forced to undergo sterilization if she returned to China.  In June 2012, the BIA dismissed 
Li‟s appeal, noting that Li “did not meet her burden of establishing that she has a well-
founded fear of persecution in China.”  The BIA also denied Li‟s motion for remand.  
This petition for review followed.
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II. 
 We review the BIA‟s order of removal, but we may look to the IJ‟s decision to the 
extent that the BIA affirmed her conclusions.  See Sandie v. Att‟y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 
250 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review factual findings for substantial evidence.  See Chavarria 
v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  Under this standard, we must uphold 
those findings “unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels 
it.”  Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001).  We review the BIA‟s 
                                              
1
 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA‟s final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1252(a)(1). 
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denial of a motion to remand or to reopen for abuse of discretion only.  See Huang v. 
Att‟y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 390 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III. 
A. Denial of Applications for Relief 
If an alien cannot establish past persecution, she must demonstrate a well-founded 
fear of future persecution to obtain asylum.  See Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 
515-16 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)).  To make this showing, an alien 
must “demonstrate a subjective fear that is supported by objective evidence that 
persecution is a reasonable possibility.”  Yu v. Att‟y Gen., 513 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 
2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Li attempted to meet this burden 
by proving that she would be individually singled out for persecution.  See Wong v. Att‟y 
Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). 
Li first alleges that the BIA erred by assigning minimal weight to documents from 
two village committees stating that an individual like her would be sterilized upon return 
to China.  The BIA questioned these documents because they were photocopies that did 
not identify the author, were not authenticated, and were obtained for purposes of the 
hearing.  Li asserts that these documents “bear . . . indicia of reliability” in the form of an 
official stamp and that their “chain of custody” is established by her mother and mother-
in-law‟s letters.  However, the seals are nearly illegible, and the letters make no mention 
of mailing these village committee documents to Li.  In these circumstances, it was 
permissible for the BIA to give the documents relatively little weight.  See Chen v. Att‟y 
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Gen., 676 F.3d 112, 117 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Lin v. Att‟y Gen., 700 F.3d 683, 686-88 
(3d Cir. 2012). 
Li further asserts that the BIA should have given greater weight to her evidence 
concerning forced sterilizations performed on her family members and other women who 
returned to China after having children abroad.  The BIA plausibly discounted the letters 
from Li‟s mother and her husband‟s aunts regarding their sterilizations because the 
women were not similarly situated to her; their children, unlike Li‟s, were not United 
States citizens.  See Lin v. Holder, 620 F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 2010).  Li also submitted 
evidence from two women who claimed to be forcibly sterilized after returning to China 
with children born in Japan and Singapore; however, these women were also not 
similarly situated to Li.  All in all, the BIA reasonably concluded that the evidence did 
not support Li‟s contention that her children would be counted against her under the 
applicable family planning policies.  Indeed, Li conceded in her testimony that she did 
not personally know any women who were forcibly sterilized after returning to China 
with children born in the United States. 
Li further asserts that the agency ignored self-authenticating evidence from a 
Fujian government website.  However, the Federal Rules of Evidence, which she cites, do 
not apply in asylum proceedings.  See Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 
2003).  Nevertheless, it was permissible for the BIA to give little weight to this evidence, 
as the website makes no mention of forcible sterilization. 
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Finally, Li argues that the BIA failed to consider her background evidence 
regarding quotas for forcible sterilizations and abortions in Chang Le City and Lianjiang 
County, as well as the local application of the family planning policy in other areas of 
Fujian Province.  The Board discounted this evidence after determining that it was similar 
to evidence it addressed in Matter of J-W-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 185 (BIA 2007), and Matter 
of J-H-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. (BIA 2006).  We agree with Li that much of this evidence 
post-dates those decisions.  However, the BIA reasonably determined that this evidence 
did not concern current country conditions, did not relate to individuals similarly situated 
to Li, or did not relate to policies in Fujian Province.  Notably, the Board reasonably 
concluded that the record as a whole reflects that physical coercion is uncommon and 
unsanctioned.  
The 2007 United States Department of State Profile of Asylum Claims and 
Country Conditions for China (“2007 Profile”) indicates that although China continues to 
enforce its family planning regulations, it does not use measures such as forcible 
sterilization on Chinese couples who return to China with two children born abroad.  See 
Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 214.  We have described Matter of H-L-
H- & Z-Y-Z- as “comprehensive” and “persuasive,” Chen, 676 F.3d at 114, and have 
noted its conclusion that “physical coercion to achieve compliance with family planning 
goals is uncommon and unsanctioned by China‟s national laws and . . . the overall policy 
is much more heavily reliant on incentives and economic penalties,” id. at 115 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Indeed, much of the evidence Li submitted indicates that 
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physical coercion is uncommon and that Fujian‟s overall policy is more heavily reliant on 
economic incentives and penalties.  See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 478 (3d Cir. 
2003) (noting that State Department reports are “the most appropriate and perhaps the 
best resource” regarding political situations).  Although Li argued that she would face an 
onerous fine for violating family planning policies, the record supports the BIA‟s 
determination that Li had not shown that she would be unable to pay the fine and that 
enforcement of such fines in Fujian Province has been “lax” and “uneven.”  Given all 
this, the evidence in the record does not compel a conclusion that Li has an objectively 
reasonable fear of forcible sterilization. 
B. Denial of Motion to Remand 
“The BIA treats a motion to remand for the purpose of submitting additional 
evidence in the same manner as motions to reopen the record.”  Huang, 620 F.3d at 389.  
Furthermore, a petitioner‟s motion to reopen must establish prima facie eligibility for 
asylum.  See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 563 (3d Cir. 2004).  This requires “the 
applicant to produce objective evidence showing a „reasonable likelihood‟ that he can 
establish [that he is entitled to relief].”  Id. (quoting Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 
175 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
 Li first alleges that the Board abused its discretion by failing to address her 
argument that neither the 2007 Profile nor the State Department‟s responses to her FOIA 
requests yielded any evidence of a law or policy barring coercion in Fujian.  However, 
the BIA specifically mentioned that the response to her FOIA requests indicates that a 
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policy of coercion is still implemented in China.  See Filja v. Gonzalez, 447 F.3d 241, 
256 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 908 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal 
quotations omitted)) (the BIA “is not required to „write an exegesis on every 
contention.‟”). 
 Li further argues that the BIA erred by finding that several of the documents 
submitted in support of her motion related to localities other than hers and her husband‟s 
and by discounting her documents as “very generalized.”  We note, as an initial matter, 
that the Board correctly determined that several of these documents pre-dated Li‟s 
hearing before the IJ and therefore could have been presented then.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1003.2(c)(1).  Furthermore, while we agree that some of Li‟s exhibits provide details 
regarding family planning campaigns in Lianjiang County, Changle City, and Jin Feng, 
her husband‟s county, locality, and town, the Board reasonably determined that none of 
them supported Li‟s assertion that coercion rising to the level of persecution is employed 
against nationals who return to China with two or more children who are United States 
citizens. 
Finally, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it rejected Li‟s 
argument that the 2007 Profile is not entitled to special deference because it was written 
by a contractor rather than the State Department.  In support, Li submitted a FOIA 
request from “Richard Tarzia” and a reply letter from the State Department with enclosed 
documents showing that “Neil E. Silver” was paid to update the 2007 Profile by 
researching various types of asylum cases.  However, the BIA reasonably concluded that 
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this evidence did not show that the State Department did not stand behind the work done 
for the 2007 Profile. 
IV. 
 Based on a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Li failed to meet her 
burden of demonstrating an objectively reasonable possibility of sterilization should she 
return to China; the evidence in the record does not compel a conclusion contrary to that 
of the BIA.  See Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2004).  Because Li did not 
meet the standard for obtaining asylum, she also failed to satisfy the “higher burden of 
proof” required for withholding of removal.  Chen, 676 F.3d at 117.  Nor have we found 
any reason to disturb the BIA‟s denial of CAT relief.  For the foregoing reasons, we will 
deny the petition for review. 
